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From Disruptive Action to Political Lobbying:
Causes and Consequences of the Institutionalization
of Forms of Contention in a Protest Campaign
Zden?k Janík1
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to analyze the causes of the gradual institutionalization of tactics and strategies of the antimilitaristic
protest campaign Arms, or Human Rights? [Zbran?, nebo lidská práva?] in the period 1997–2007. The campaign’s
collective action evolved from an episodic contentious collective action to sustained interaction with opponents under the auspices
of a newly formed social movement organization Nesehnutí and the campaign’s forms of contention progressed from radical,
disruptive actions against opponents to political lobbying and negotiations with political actors and allies within the political
establishment. The analysis of interaction between the campaign’s internal dynamics and its external conditions will clarify how
the campaign’s active appropriation of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and its politically binding
criteria opened to the actors in the campaign an institutional access to negotiations of their claims with political actors and how
the institutional access influenced interactive and communicative processes among the actors within the campaign and brought on
the change in the campaign’s forms of contention. Apart from analysis of written documents, the research relies on data collected
by means of participant-observation from April 2005 to May 2007.
Key words: Campaign, Contentious Collective Action, European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Forms of Contention, Framing,
Mobilizing Structures, Nesehnutí, Political opportunity, Social Movement Organization (SMO)
Introduction
Contentious collective action is an episodic, public interaction between groups of
claimants, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and the objects of their claims, i.e.
elites, authorities, and opponents (Tarrow 1998: 2-3; McAdam et al. 2001: 5; Tilly 2004: 12).  The
incentives for contentious collective action to be launched are provided by institutional
conditions and structures in the external environment. Changes in institutional rules, political
alignments, or alliance structures can set contentious collective action in motion by giving the
claimants the opportunity to gain political support of their claims within the political system
1 Author is a doctoral student of Political science at the Department of Political Science in Faculty of Social Studies
of Masaryk University, Joštova 10, 602 00 Brno. Currently, he is an assistant at the Department of English Language
and Literature in the Faculty of Education of Masaryk University, Po???í 9/11, 603 00 Brno; e-mail:
janikz@mail.muni.cz.
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(McAdam et al. 1997: 153; Tarrow 1998: 79). Although political opportunities and threats2 offer
certain potentials for the claimants’ collective action, it is the claimants’ perception and
interpretation of the opportunities and threats that realizes those potentials in the form of
collective action (McAdam et al.  1996:  5;  McAdam et al.  2001:  43;  Tarrow 1998:  77).  Thus the
ultimate implementation of contentious collective action is conditioned by the interaction
between structural factors, embodied by external political opportunities and internal mobilizing
structures of the collective claim-makers, and cultural factors, denoting meanings and definitions
of grievances and claims that people share, as well as their belief in their capability to redress the
problem by means of collective action.
Mobilizing structures constitute both established organizations and informal networks
“through which people come together and engage in collective action” (McAdam et al.1997: 155).
The existence of such social networks per se does not guarantee that collective action will take
place. Activists and their sympathizers may draw on their mutual personal or public bonds and
links when deciding about their participation in collective action, or their decision to take part in
new collective action may be influenced by their previous or current involvement in other
contentious collective action (Diani, McAdam 2003). Yet the prerequisite for collective action to
take place is the existence of shared beliefs and worldviews that will motivate the actors and
legitimize their collective action. Therefore, next to the political opportunities, it is mobilizing
structures likewise cultural variables that account for collective action (McAdam et al. 1997: 157;
Tarrow 1998).
The  study  of  shared  ideas  and  meanings  and  their  social  construction  among  actors  in
social  networks  is  referred  to  as  a  framing  process  (Snow  et  al.  1986;  Snow,  Benford  1988;
Benford, Snow 2000). Participants coordinate their collective action through collective action
frames that help them underscore the injustice of a social situation, identify those who are
responsible for the grievances and delimit the boundaries between their collective identity as
claim-makers and those who are objects of their claims (Gamson 1992). By means of collective
action frames protesters also convey meanings of their actions and goals to antagonists,
authorities, and bystanders or observers (Benford, Snow 2000: 613). To communicate their ideas
and meanings to the various publics, protesters use certain forms of contention, including rallies,
2 The changes in the political  structure can also be interpreted by activists as threats to their claims, e.g.  when the
activists are convinced that political actors will not acknowledge the existence of political problem the activists
intend to address or when they refuse to recognize activists’ claims. The activists may view this inaction on the part
of political actors as a challenge to be addressed by contentious collective action (Klandermans 1997).
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demonstrations, organizing marches, disruption, vigils, and the like. The repertoire of contention
signifies the culturally learned and transmitted conventions of contention used by particular
groups (Tarrow 1998: 20-21). Repertoires evolve as a result of struggle with opponents and the
protester’s improvisation of the inherited repertoires by infusing them with new frames of
meaning (Tarrow 1998: 20-21; McAdam et al. 2001: 49). The evolvement of repertoire of
contention marks the path from violence to disruption that further may become routinized into
convention, i.e. culturally understandable and acceptable forms of contention (Tarrow 1998: 104).
The use of repertoire of contention, mobilizing structures, and collective action frames are
fundamental properties of social movements. Social movement is a distinctive form of
contentious politics with the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against opponents. By
means of campaigns and repertoire of contention social movements make possible sustained,
organized, public, and collective claim-making on targeted authorities and opponents (Tilly 2004:
3-4).
The organizational underpinning of social movement, marked by the evolution from an
episodic contentious collective action to social movement organization (SMO) and its sustained
interaction with opponents, is a question for further research that sheds a light on how
movement’s internal dynamics interact with their external contexts (cf. Whittier 2002: 289-307).
The collective action of social movements and their use of contention, ranging from rallies,
public meetings and discussions to petition drives, official statements and press release, extend
beyond the interaction between the groups of claimants and the objects of their claims and have
an effect on third parties as well, such as constituents and various publics, including enemies,
state authorities, and the media (Tilly 2004: 12). These contexts of interactions have influence on
movements’ collective action, their framing processes and repertoire of contention they use.
Movements’ framing efforts are determined by broader political and social contexts. In
order to frame social problems and injustice and convince a wide audience of the necessity to
collectively address and redress them, social movement organizations draw on the reservoir of
culturally shared symbols, values and worldviews from which they accentuate and clarify those
cultural aspects that will resonate with the movement’s views and ideas and that will invigorate
the significance of a particular issue or problem for those who are targets of mobilization and/or
objects of claims (Benford, Snow 2000). At the same time the framing process is the subject of
intense contestation between SMOs and the media. The media frames the movements’ activities
in  certain  ways  that  are  compatible  with  the  media’s  intention  to  sell  the  news,  but  may  be
harmful to the movements’ ideas and goals. Apart from the media the state authorities and
St?edoevropské politické studie Ro?ník IX, ?íslo 4, s. 315-332
Central European Political Studies Review Volume IX, Part 4, pp. 315-332
Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity ISSN 1212-7817
318
opponents frame the movements’ claims in such a way as to belittle their political significance or
refuse recognition of the political claims and problems (cf. McAdam et al. 1996: 16-17; Gamson
1992; Tarrow 1998). The SMOs respond to those competing and antagonistic frames by
strategically implying collective action frames that will challenge the media’s and opponents’
interpretations and will straighten the movements’ public reputation and legitimacy of their goals.
The strategic framing may take the form of attributing empirical credibility to the collective
action frames, their backing by various scientifically adequate expertise and their acknowledgment
by politically recognized figures and authorities that will make together the frames culturally
believable and politically legitimate (cf. Benford, Snow 2000: 620-621).
Part of the framing is not only the process by which movements identify a political
problem and its causes, but also the negotiation and choice of solutions and strategies that
movements find reasonable for redressing the problem (Snow, Benford 1988; 2000). The
movement’s use of strategies, or forms of contention, is conditioned by the movement’s
interaction with objects of their claims, opponents, and third parties. For example to mobilize
support of bystanders, the movement may opt for public briefings or other informative activities
that will persuade the public about the gravity of a political problem; as a response to authorities’
ignorance or defiance to the movement’s appeals, the social movement actors may decide to use
more radical and disruptive forms of action to draw the public’s attention to the behaviour of the
state authorities and to convince the authorities to take the movement’s claims seriously. At the
same time, in order to establish itself as a serious social and political counterpart in the constant
conflict  and  negotiation  with  authorities  and  objects  of  claims,  the  movement  can  use  certain
framing strategies to appropriate political opportunities and gain support of political actors and
influential organizations.
This course of action and communication of social movement’s actors with authorities
and other objects of claims marks ongoing “borrowing and adapting each other’s ideas,
personnel, assistance, rhetoric, and models of action” (Tilly 2004: 14), which can ultimately lead
to the institutionalization of social movement tactics characterized by establishment of
“comfortable relations [of social movement actors] with authorities” and reliance on “support
from the rich and powerful” (ibid.: 156). The movement’s gradual replacement of disruptive
forms of action with political lobbying, negotiation and compromise can have the consequences
of transforming the movement into a party or interest group (Tarrow 1998: 101).
The following part of the paper presents the result of research that accounts for the
causes of gradual change in forms of contention in the campaign Arms, or Human Rights? from
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radical and disruptive forms of action to political lobbying and negotiations with actors within
the political system. By using certain framing strategies and with the cooperation of influential,
international non-governmental organizations, the campaign eventually appropriated political
opportunity and attained the support of certain political allies who assisted the social movement
actors in bringing forward their claims and ideas to the political actors. This process accompanied
successive institutionalization and structuralization of interaction between the campaign and the
objects of their claims. The institutionalization of relations had a direct influence on interactive
framing processes and negotiations among the actors within the campaign, their collective action
frames, and use of forms of contention. Although the antimilitaristic campaign does not
constitute the social movement organization as a whole, its formation substantially contributed to
the origination of the organization Nesehnutí. Therefore, the first part of research explains how
certain factors within mobilizing structures and collective action frames, that set in motion the
collective action of actors in the forming campaign Arms, or Human Rights?, helped initiate the
goals, ideas, and structure of newly formed social movement organization.
Conditions of the establishment of the protest campaign and SMO
The platform of collective action’s mobilization was formed around a group of actors
originally participating in the environmentalist SMO Hnutí DUHA. The actors’ effort was to
decentralize the organization and extend the area of their ecological interests to social causes
accounting for undesirable changes in the environment. Unable to put their ideas through in the
original organization, they decided to realize their intentions by establishing a new non-
governmental organization. The mobilizing structures and collective action frames contributing
to the onset of the movement’s formation epitomized network of actors who, building on
knowledge and experiences they had gathered in the previous movement, shared ideas about the
new structure and face of organization. The actors likewise had a common understanding of new
frames linking environmental protection with social issues and problems and encompassing the
protection of environment, human rights, and animal rights.
Other important factor behind the formation of SMO Nesehnutí was provided by then
episodic contentious politics targeted against the International Defence and Security Technology
Trade Fair (IDET) in Brno in spring 1997. A group of protesters, including Milan Štefanec and
other actors originally involved in the activities of the movement Hnutí DUHA, launched
disruptive activities to express their disproval with the IDET. Following the protest and prior to
the formation of the organization Nesehnutí, the participants decided to go on planning and
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implementing similar activities highlighting social and ecological problems in a way extending
beyond isolated protests. As a result, an antimilitaristic group was formed that began to oppose
the holding of IDET on regular bases and that became a springboard for the creation of the
campaign Arms, or Human Rights? The contentious collective action targeted against companies
and enterprises involved in the arms and defence industry and exhibiting their products at the
IDET became the first object of action of the campaign as well as the newly shaping organization
Nesehnutí. Campaigning provided the means for sustained interaction with the object of claims
and at the same time mirrored the idea of a decentralized form of organization based on the
democratic process of decision-making. The evolving organizational structure along with the
collective action frames opened an opportunity to other groups of people aggrieved by particular
social injustice and problems falling under the umbrella of the broad master frame of human
rights and ready to mobilize to a collective action through protest campaigns.3
External sources of the campaign’s collective action
The collective action in the campaign Arms, or Human Rights? further  developed  as
a consequence of conditions offered within the broader political context and appropriation of
those conditions by the actors in the campaign. In view of the campaign, the revitalization of the
arms industry,  growing arms export and sale of redundant and discarded arms from the Czech
Republic created economic and political conditions favouring uncontrolled proliferation of Czech
arms and their potential as well as real misuse in the violation of human rights and the escalation
of conflicts within the final destinations of the arms export.
Next to the political threat to transparency and public control of the arms export, the
collective action of the participants was influenced by certain political opportunity and its
appropriation by the campaign. In 1998 the Czech Republic endorsed the principles of the
European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports that represents a strong recommendation
of the EU to responsible state authorities to enforce high common standards in control and
3 Following the antimilitaristic campaign, other campaigns dealing with human rights sprang to existence (Women’s
rights are human rights [Ženská práva jsou lidská práva], S.O.S. Chechnya [S.O.S. ???ensko], Safety for Refugees
[Bezpe?í pro uprchlíky]) as well as campaigns involved in the environmental protection and addressing its social
causes (Focused on Hypermarkets [Zaost?eno na hypermarkety],  Against the Highway 43 [Proti  R43],  and For the
Preservation of Wilson woods [Za záchranu Wilsonova lesa]); (http://www.nesehnuti.cz).
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supervision of arms export and to increase transparency among EU states on arms exports.4 The
EU Code and endorsement of its principles by the Czech Republic became the source of the
campaign’s collective action framing. The second criterion of the EU Code obliges the member
states to prevent arm exports to areas where they could be used for internal repression and
violation of human rights. This criterion corresponds with the master frame of human rights
defence recognized by both the campaign and the SMO and provided legitimacy to the
campaign’s collective action. Since 1999 the campaign has used the EU code criterion for framing
their claim on the government’s withdrawal of official political support to holding of the arms
fair IDET, alleging that companies exhibiting their products in the IDET sell their arms and
defence technology to countries involved in the violation of human rights (Nesehnutí 1999).
Since 2003 the campaign has further utilized the principles listed in the EU code to target another
objects of their newly framed claims on transparency in the process of applying for and issuing of
export licence for military equipment and on the establishment of parliament and public control
of arms export. Thus the campaign extended the scope of the collective action from protest
activities against the IDET to sustained interaction with the political authorities responsible for
the trade in military equipment.
Although the EU Code is politically binding, its legal liability is challenged by the national
policy regulating arms sale and export.5 Due to the national regulations and low level of
government co-operation with administrative bodies and non-governmental organizations on
European  level,  the  Czech  endorsement  of  the  EU criteria  did  not  secure  for  the  campaign  an
institutional access and political support to negotiations of trade in military equipment with
4 The  European  Union  Code  of  Conduct  on  Arms  Exports  is  available  at  the  website  of  the  Czech  Ministry  of
Foreign Affairs (http://www.mzv.cz/kontrolaexportu). An English version of the EU Code can be downloaded
from the website of the campaign Arms, or Human Rights? (http://zbrane.ecn.cz/cz/doc/eucode.rtf).
5 Arms sale  and export  is  regulated  in  the  Czech Republic  by  Act  no.  38/1994 Coll.,  on  Foreign  trade  in  military
equipment. The Act defines the roles and responsibilities of state administration bodies in the administrative
procedure. The Ministry of Industry and Trade issues permits and export licenses and is therefore directly
responsible for foreign trade in military equipment. In order for a permit to be issued, an approval must be given by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic that judges the application from the view of foreign policy and
by  Ministry  of  Defence  and The  Ministry  of  Interior  of  the  Czech Republic  that  take  into  consideration  possible
impacts on security. For each export of military equipment a licence is issued by the Ministry of Industry and Trade
with  the  approval  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Foreign  trade  in  military  equipment  is  supervised  by  the
Ministerial Licence Committee that ensures that arms export from the Czech Republic respects international
agreements and embargoes applied by the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe.
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political actors. The campaign nonetheless actively used the criteria of the EU Code to open the
political opportunity.
The process of opening of the political opportunity accompanied gradual change in the
campaign’s forms of contention from radical and disruptive actions to political lobbying, co-
operation with allies in the political system, and systematic co-operation with well-known non-
governmental organizations. While the protest activities against the IDET in the years 1999 and
2001 characterized the use of disruptive action on the part of the campaign, the IDET of the
following years 2003, 2005, and 2007 saw the campaign’s gradual retreat from blockade and
picketing and their replacement with happenings, organized marches, and informative campaigns
for the general public. The shift in the forms of contention is also apparent in comparisons of the
campaign’s contentious collective actions targeted at the Czech ministries responsible for the
trade  in  military  equipment.  In  the  years  2003  and  2004  the  campaign  resorted  to  radical
disruptive  actions  against  the  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Trade  and  the  Ministry  of  Defence.  As
a result of the campaign’s interaction with other ministry responsible for the arms trade and
export, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by the beginning of 2005 the campaign’s forms of
contention gradually succumbed to their institutionalization.
The campaign’s forms of contention and their development
During the opening ceremony of the IDET 1999 a group of activists from the campaign
and SMO Nesehnutí broke into the area of the IDET fair ground and disrupted the press
conference (Nesehnutí 1999). In the year of the following IDET 2001 the activists realized
picketing and happening in front of the gates of the fair ground and their protest concluded with
the march through the centre of the city Brno (Nesehnutí 2001a; 2001b). In 2003 and 2005 the
venue of the campaign’s collective action moved to the centre of Brno, where the activists
performed happening, distributed leaflets and press releases, and took part in the organization of
protest marches through the city to the fair ground of IDET (Nesehnutí 2003a; Nesehnutí 2005).
In 2007 the campaign’s activity was limited to the issuing of press release (Nesehnutí 2007).
The reason for the change in the campaign’s forms of contention following the radical
action of the activists in 1999 was the ensuing safety precautions on the part of the IDET
organizers, which made the risk of launching similar radical activity within the area of the fair
ground unbearable. The overall change in the forms of contention, their diversification and
subsequent limitation to informative campaign and press releases between 2001 and 2007, can be
accounted by the campaign’s intensive work on appropriation of the EU Code. In 2003 the
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primary focus of the campaign’s activities turned from the isolated protests against the IDET to
strategic and organized persuasion of the political actors and opponents to abide with the criteria
of the EU Code. Consequently the protests against the IDET eventually lost their priority on the
campaign’s agenda and had to yield to the campaign’s institutionalized interaction with other
opponents and political actors. The year 2007 thus marks the campaign’s use of political lobbying
and the withdrawal from broad and intensive protest activities against the IDET.
The way towards the campaign’s use of conventional strategies was not straightforward.
In years 2003 and 2004 the campaign repeatedly resorted to disruptive actions against those
political opponents who, in view of the campaign, failed to recognize a significant role of the EU
Code in the national control of arms export or in their actions directly violated the criteria of the
code.
The political problem framed by the campaign was the non-transparent and uncontrolled
sale and export of arms that the campaign decided to redress by implementing certain forms of
action: by means of intensive monitoring the participants in the campaign gathered necessary
information about the arms export, briefed the media on the result of their scrutiny and made
them public through press releases. To draw the general public’s attention to the issue of arms
sale and export, the actors organized and took part in rallies, blockades, and happenings targeted
at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, that is responsible for issuing export licences for military
equipment, and the Ministry of Defence, that due to the NATO’s demands on the modernization
of the Czech army realized the sale of obsolete defence technology and arms.
The building of the Ministry of Industry and Trade became a target of disruptive actions
in 2003. A group of volunteers from the campaign and the SMO Nesehnutí blocked the entrance
to the ministry’s building and managed to display the logo of Nesehnutí on the balcony of the
building. The objective of the blockade was to persuade the ministry to respect the criteria of the
EU  code.  The  activists  delivered  their  claims  to  the  minister  who  promised  to  take  them  into
consideration (Nesehnutí 2003a). Thanks to the media coverage, the protest gained certain public
attention.6 The ministry eventually rejected the campaign’s claim in an official press release stating
that it could not ensure that the export of Czech military equipment would not result in misuse
of the arms by people in the final destination of the export (Nesehnutí 2004a). The campaign
considered the ministry’s response as a sign of disrespect of the criterion two of the EU Code
6 E.g. “Aktivisti viseli na budov? ministerstva” (iDnes, 17.3.2003). Alarm 19/2003 informs that the program “Fakta”
of  the  Czech  national  television  voiced  their  interest  to  invite  representatives  of  the  campaign  and  Nesehnutí  to
a filming of reportage on arms export from the Czech Republic.
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and escalated their collective contentious politics by organizing petition drive and happening in
front of the ministry’s building in December 2003 (Nesehnutí 2003a; 2004a).
The reason for the campaign’s radical protest activities targeted at the Czech Ministry of
Defence in 2003 and 2004 was an uncontrolled sale of obsolete and discarded military equipment
by the ministry. The campaign’s intensive monitoring and gathering of information revealed that
the sale was not done according to proper inventory and that the Czech ammunition and military
equipment were re-exported to areas under international embargoes.7 The ministry rejected the
campaign’s allegations and refused responsibility for the re-export of Czech military equipment to
conflicting areas (ibid.).  The campaign interpreted the action on part  of the ministry as a direct
violation of the EU code and launched a blockade of the ministry’s building in 2003 and again in
spring 2004 to thwart ministry’s plan to continue with the sell of military equipment (Nesehnutí
2004b).
The campaign’s use of radical and disruptive actions against the Ministry of Industry and
Trade and the Ministry of Defence can be accounted for by the lack of will to co-operate on the
part of the ministries, consequent denial of institutional access to the campaign’s negotiations
with the ministries, and the ministries’ disrespect and violation of obligations stated in the EU
Code.
On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) chose to cooperate with the
campaign and other non-governmental organizations by means of issuing an annual national
report on foreign trade with military equipment realized in the Czech Republic. This opening of
the  institutional  access  to  the  campaign  in  the  end  of  2004  had  an  impact  on  the  campaign’s
forms of contention and framing process. Despite the fact that in view of the campaign the
annual reports revealed ongoing non-transparency and deficiency in control of the arms export,
the campaign did not opt for disruptive actions but instead agreed to written communication
with the ministry and regularly voiced their criticism through press releases. The resulting
structuralization of relations between the campaign and MFA further affected communication
and negotiations among the actors participating in the campaign.
7 The  campaign  and  SMO  Nesehnutí  backed  the  credibility  of  their  informative  sources  by  the  United  Nation
register,  customs lists  from the  Ministry  of  Finance  of  the  Czech Republic,  and  the  report  of  the  Supreme Audit
Office  of  the  Czech  Republic  from  16.12.2002  that  voiced  concern  with  the  stage  of  inventory  of  the  military
equipment subject to sale by the Ministry of Defence. Drawing on the Act no. 106/1999 Coll.,  on Free Access to
Information, the campaign also obtained information from the Ministry of Defence on the number, type, and quality
of the Czech army ammunition, including the list of military equipment that was exported to Afghanistan (Nesehnutí
2003a; Alarm no. 24, February 2004; Nesehnutí 2003b).
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The institutionalization of the campaign’s forms of contention: its causes and
consequences
Whereas the Ministry of Industry and Trade is directly responsible for the control of arms
export from the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) acts in the process of
issuing export licenses as an advisory body, considering possible impact of arms export on the
foreign policy. The campaign’s objective was to convince the ministry of the political binding
force of the EU Code and to find accord among both actors in the question of incorporation of
the  Code’s  obligations  into  the  national  regulations  of  trade  with  military  equipment.8 The
ministry granted institutional access to the campaign’s representatives by inviting them to
a seminar with the goal of discussing the potential of making information on the Czech arms
export public.9 In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  EU  Code  the  MFA  pledged  to  make
transparent the trade with military equipment and to inform, on yearly basis, the public on
military trades in the Czech Republic (Nesehnutí 2004c). The first report, entitled Annual Report
on Export Control of Military Equipment and Small Arms for Civilian Use in the Czech Republic
in 2003, informed on military trade realized in 2003 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech
Republic 2004). The annual reports of 2004 and 2005 became the hub of interaction between the
MFA and the campaign that by means regular press releases commented on each of the MFA’s
report  and  criticized  its  content.  Although  the  campaign  in  its  press  releases  repeatedly
emphasized that the data published in the MFA’s annual reports revealed violation of the EU
Code principles by the Czech Republic, the MFA insisted on the contrary, claiming that the
reports clearly manifested adherence to the EU Code.
In comparison to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which admitted that military trade
cannot be fully regulated by the criteria of the EU Code because it would be in discrepancy with
the  protection  of  classified  information,  and  the  Ministry  of  Defence,  whose  sale  of  discarded
military equipment directly violated the Code, the MFA through their annual reports declared
that arm exports from the Czech Republic did not violate the criteria of EU Code. The campaign
responded to the MFA’s assertion by intensive monitoring of the countries listed in the MFA’s
8 By  national  regulations  is  meant  the  Act  No.  38/1994  Coll.  on  Foreign  Trade  in  Military  Equipment  and  on
Amendment  to  Act  No.  455/1991  Coll.  on  Trades  (Trades  Licensing  Act),  as  Amended,  and  Act  No.  140/1961
Coll., the Criminal Code as Amended.
9 Next to the representatives of the campaign and SMO Nesehnutí, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also invited the
representatives of the NGO Transparency International to the political negotiations.
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report as recipients of Czech military equipment in the year 2003 and brought forward evidence
pointing at the violation of human rights and civil wars taking place in the areas that obtained
military assistance from the Czech Republic. The campaign framed the gathered information in
a way so as to challenge the MFA’s statements and convince both the ministry and the public of
the continual infringement of the EU Code on the part of the Czech Republic. The campaign
voiced  their  beliefs  and  concerns  in  the  press  releases  in  2004  and  again  in  2006  following  the
MFA’s annual report of 2005 (Nesehnutí 2004d; 2006).10 The MFA repeatedly refused the
campaign’s allegations and kept on insisting that the Czech Republic strictly followed the
principles of the EU Code.
The  publicity  of  the  campaign’s  claims  met  with  a  partial  success  thanks  to  the  co-
operation with the Czech branch of Amnesty International. Jan Winkler, the former Deputy
Foreign Ministry for the Security Policy of the Czech Republic, accepted the criticism of AI in an
interview  for  the  Czech  BBC  when  admitting  that  the  MFA  did  not  succeed  in  making  arms
export fully transparent and consistent with the EU Code obligations. At the same time, though,
he denied that the Czech Republic had breached the EU criteria. (BBC 2005)
The reasons for the MFA’s ambiguous stance to the role of the EU Code lie in the
structure of relations between the ministry, other state administrative bodies, and authorities
involved  in  the  trade  with  military  equipment.  The  MFA  has  to  face  the  pressure  of  the  pro-
export policy facilitated by the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Defence Industry
Association of Czech Republic that together criticize the MFA for obstructing their interests.
While  the  Licence  Department  of  the  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Trade  resists  the  claim  on
transparency of the arms trade because of its demand on the disclosure of classified information,
the MFA has to attend to the reputation of the country abroad, which, among others, has
a bearing on the country’s acceptance of EU policies, including those specified under the EU
Code (ibid.).
The MFA is subjected to a situation in which it is forced to seek compromise between the
actors who call for open trade with military equipment and those who oppose these tendencies.
The resulting structure of diverse interests in the Czech political scene interferes with the NGOs’
demand on putting the criteria of the EU Code in practice. This also explains why the campaign’s
convincing strategies targeted at the MFA did not meet with acceptance and failed to forge
10 The annual reports listing the export of military equipment in the years 2003 and 2004 were issued in the end of
the years 2004 and 2005 respectively. Consequently, the campaign could not release the press statements to the
respective MFA’s reports no sooner than in December 2004 and February 2006 respectively.
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collective interest in incorporating the EU Code and its provisions into the national regulations
of arms export. The campaign achieved only certain procedural success by having been granted
an  institutional  access  to  the  negotiations  with  political  actors,  which  enabled  the  campaign  to
sustain interaction with the MFA. On the other hand, the institutional access did not provide the
campaign with an opportunity to influence structural relations and interests of the participating
political actors. Quite contrary, the structure of the political relations heavily affected the
collective action, interaction, and communication among the actors within the campaign.11
The institutional negotiations between the campaign and the MFA were initiated and
remained  under  the  control  of  the  ministry.  The  MFA  determined  the  structure  of  the
communication: the communication was to take the form of written opinions, proposals, and
comments that could be delivered for examination to the editor of the MFA’s annual reports on
export,  Petr  Kaiser.  The  MFA  appointed  Kaiser  as  the  only  contact  person  in  the  discussions
between the ministry and the campaign’s representatives. This consequently limited the
campaign’s use of contention to political lobbying and deliberation. The forms of contention and
possible alternative suggestions to their use were not a subject of discussion among the actors in
the  campaign,  which  indicates  the  structural  relations  set  by  the  MFA.  The  yearly  cycle  of
releasing the MFA’s reports on arms export, which in its content repeatedly defied the legitimacy
of the campaign’s claims and allegations, eventually inhibited the campaign and its participants in
strategic framing that would interpret the political problem and the campaign’s stance to the
MFA’s reports in more innovative way. The low level of flexibility in use of strategies and
framing processes reflected the routinization of the campaign’s collective work on press releases
and statements to public media.
The campaign’s utilization of institutionalized forms of contention: political lobbying
Although the structure of the institutional negotiations in its consequences reduced the
campaign’s  forms  of  contention  to  statements  to  public  media,  press  releases,  and  political
lobbying, it eventually helped the campaign to master and gain confidence in the strategy of
political lobbying. The institutionalization of the campaign’s forms of contention, triggered by
structural relations with the MFA, thus contributed to the campaign’s utilization of the political
11 The assessment of the influence of institutional negotiations on the collective action, deliberation of strategies, and
framing  processes  among  the  actors  taking  part  in  the  campaign  relied  on  the  author’s  participant-observation  in
years 2005 and 2006.
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lobbying with the goal to convince other political actors to accept the campaign’s newly framed
claims.
The process of approving the Czech annual reports on export and trade with military
equipment has been entirely under the control of the government and the MFA that presents the
reports to the public in press conferences. The campaign decided to bypass this political structure
by seeking allies on the parliamentarian level who would help the campaign to put through the
claim on parliamentary control of the arms export. By means of intensive lobbying and with the
cooperation of the Czech branch of Amnesty International the campaign succeeded in opening
a political opportunity when they gained an ally in the Czech Senate, the Senator Jaromír Štetina,
who promised to act on behalf of the campaign’s claim.
In February 2006 the representative of the campaign and SMO Nesehnutí, Milan
Štefanec, was invited to the meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and
Security. The Committee was inspired and drew on the campaign’s claims and ideas when writing
a text of resolution to the “EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW
and their ammunition” (Výbor pro zahrani?ní v?ci, obranu a bezpe?nost 2006). In negotiations
with the Senator Jaromír Št?tina the campaign achieved the following: the SMO Nesehnutí and
its representatives were offered the service of the Parliamentary Institute for research in the field
of arms trade and export and were also invited to participate in creation of materials to be dealt
with by the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Security.
The political opportunity resulted in further professionalization of the campaign’s
activities. The sustained co-operation with political actors had to be met with a systematic work,
professional management of strategies and activities, support of broader coalition of NGOs, and
financial aid that in turn could be secured only by designing and implementing a project. The
project  entitled  “Public  control  –  Safeguard  to  Human  Rights”  [Ve?ejná  kontrola  –  záruka
lidských práv], financially supported by the foundation NROS (2006), brought together
Nesehnutí, Amnesty International, and the Ecumenical Academy in Prague whose participants
joined their efforts to lobby the political actors in question of public and parliamentary control of
the trade with military equipment.
The objectives and strategies defined in the project as well as division of activities among
the project participants have prompted further transition in the campaign’s forms of contention
and influenced the structure of interaction and communication among actors taking part in the
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campaign Arms, or Human Rights?12. The determination and division of activities among the
participating organizations have limited space for ad hoc activities and ruled out disruptive and
radical strategies whose use would be incompatible with the ideas outlined in the project. In
addition, the project activities have been accomplished predominantly by the project’s
representatives who had taken the responsibility for fulfilling the project’s goals and the related
financial liability linked with the requirements of the project. Thus the centre of collective action,
deliberation of strategies, interactive framing processes, sharing of new ideas and beliefs in what
should be done and why have moved from the meetings of the campaign’s participators to
a coalition circle of non-governmental organizations and their representatives.
Conclusion
Revitalization of the Czech production and export of conventional arms raised a political
issue of uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of the Czech arms for violation of human rights
and the escalation of conflicts in the final destinations of the arms exports. The antimilitaristic
campaign Arms, or Human Rights? appropriated the criteria of the European Union Code of
Conduct on Arms Exports to frame the political problem and raise a claim on transparency and
public control of the arms trade and export.
The campaign’s collective action grew from an episodic contention targeted against the
IDET 1997 to the implementation of regular protest activities in years 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005,
and 2007. Within those years the forms of contention developed from a radical disruptive action
to diversified forms of contention, yet in 2007 the scope of the campaign’s protest activities
against  the  IDET  narrowed  to  the  issuing  of  press  release.  From  2003  on  the  campaign’s
attention occupied the sustained interaction with the political actors who wielded considerable
influence on the military trade and arms export. The radical and disruptive actions targeted
against the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of Defence were followed by
the institutional negotiations with the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The structure of
interaction established between the campaign and the MFA resulted in the routinization of the
campaign’s activities and the final replacement of disruptive actions with conventional strategies.
12 Among others, the project “Public control” lists the following objectives: 1) creating materials for the Members of
Parliament (with the emphasis on stating reasons for parliamentary control of the trade with military equipment); 2)
political lobbying; 3) creating leaflets and other informative materials, organizing public discussions; 3) monitoring of
the  Czech  and  foreign  media  sources  for  information  on  arms  trade  and  export  and  their  archiving;  4)  regular
releasing press statements; 5) organizing press conferences with the possible participation of political allies.
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The gradual institutionalization of campaign’s tactics was highlighted in 2006 when the campaign,
by means of political lobbying and intensive framing of the EU criteria, obtained political support
of the claim on parliamentary control of the arms export. By the year 2007 the campaign’s
activities fully concentrate on political lobbying and professional project work, leaving little space
to organizing protests activities against the IDET.
The campaign’s collective action progressed from disruptive actions to the use of
conventional strategies, negotiated and agreed upon within a circle of antimilitaristic activists, and
finally to the institutionalized forms of contention and systematic work on projects, performed
by actors in a broad coalition of non-governmental organizations. This process suggests
successive professionalization of the social movement organization Nesehnutí since 1997 to
present. Next to the campaign Arms, or Human Rights?, professionalization of collective action
distinguishes today also other campaigns in Nesehnutí, such as Women’s  rights  are  human  rights
[Ženská práva jsou lidská práva] and Focused on Hypermarkets [Zaost?eno na hypermarkety].
Analysis of the process of professionalization of the social movement organization is, however,
a question of further research that would focus on activities of all the main campaigns of
Nesehnutí and their development.
Literature
Benford, R. – Snow, D. (2000):  Framing Processes and Social  Movements:  An Overview and Assessment, Annual
Review of Sociology, Vol. XXVI, pp. 611-639.
Diani, M. – McAdam, D. (2003, eds.): Social  Movements and Network. Relational  Approaches to Collective  Action, Oxford,
Oxford University Press.
Gamson, W. A. (1992): Talking Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Klandermans, B. (1997): The Social Psychology of Protest, Cambridge (MA), Blackwell.
McAdam, D. – McCarthy, J. D. – Zald, M. N. (1996, eds.): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political
Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
McAdam, D. – Tarrow, S. – Tilly, Ch. (1997): Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and
Revolution, in: Lichbach, M. I. – Zuckerman, A. S. (eds.): Comparative Politics. Rationality, Culture, and Structure,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 142-173.
McAdam, D. – Tarrow, S. – Tilly, Ch. (2001): Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Snow,  D.  –  Benford,  R.  (1988):  Ideology,  Frame  Resonance,  and  Participant  Mobilization,  in:  Klandermans,  B.  –
Kriesi, H. – Tarrow, S. (eds.): International Social Movement Research,  Vol.  I,  Greenwich, JAI Press,  pp. 197-
217.
Snow, D. – Rochford, B. – Worden, S.  – Benford, R. (1986):  Frame Alignment Processes,  Micromobilization, and
Movement Participation, American Sociological Review, Vol. LI, No. 4, pp. 464-481.
Tarrow, S. (1998): Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics, New York, Cambridge University Press.
St?edoevropské politické studie Ro?ník IX, ?íslo 4, s. 315-332
Central European Political Studies Review Volume IX, Part 4, pp. 315-332
Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity ISSN 1212-7817
331
Tilly, Ch. (2004): Social Movements 1768–2004, Boulder, Paradigm Publishers.
Whittier, N. (2002): Meaning and Structure in Social Movements, in: Meyer, D. – Whittier, N. – Robnett, B. (eds.):
Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 289-307.
Electronic sources
BBC (2005): První nám?stek ministra zahrani?í Jan Winkler odmítá, že by ?eská republika porušovala evropský kodex o vývozu
zbraní. O porušování kodexu mluví nevládní organizace, interview, available at <www.bbc.co.uk/czech/interview/
story/2005/08/050830_winkler.shtm>.
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Czech Republic  (2004): Annual Report on Export Control of Military Equipment and
Small Arms for Civilian Use in the Czech Republic in 2004, available at <http://www.mzv.cz/kontrolaexportu>.
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Czech Republic  (2005): Annual Report on Export Control of Military Equipment and
Small Arms for Civilian Use in the Czech Republic in 2005, available at <http://www.mzv.cz/kontrolaexportu>.
NROS (2006): Annual Report of the Civil Society Development Foundation, available at <http://www.nros.cz/vyrocni-
zpravy-nros>.
Výbor pro zahrani?ní v?ci, obranu a bezpe?nost (2006): 128. usnesení Výboru pro zahrani?ní v?ci, obranu a bezpe?nost z 24.
sch?ze, konané dne 22. února 2006 k návrhu strategie EU pro boj proti nedovolenému hromad?ní ru?ních palných a lehkých
zbraní a st?eliva do nich a proti nedovolenému obchodování s nimi, available at <http://www.senat.cz/xqw/xervlet/
pssenat/webNahled?id_doc=36531&id_var=30880>.
SMO Nesehnutí materials
Nesehnutí (1999): Výro?ní zpráva 1999, Annual report, available at <http://www.nesehnuti.cz/cz/info.html#vyr>.
Nesehnutí (2001a): Výro?ní zpráva 2001, Annual report, available at <http://www.nesehnuti.cz/cz/info.html#vyr>.
Nesehnutí (2001b): Uml?me zbran? IDET 2001, Press release, available at <http://www.nesehnuti.cz/cz/
tiskovky2001.html>.
Nesehnutí (2003a): Výro?ní zpráva 2003, Annual report, available at <http://www.nesehnuti.cz/cz/info.html#vyr>.
Nesehnutí (2003b): Starou munici neprodávat – zni?it, Press release, available at <http://zbrane.ecn.cz/cz/
tiskovky.html>.
Nesehnutí (2004a): Zpravodaj Alarm, no. 22, February 2004, Reporter, available at <http://www.nesehnuti.cz/cz/
alarm/alarm22.html>.
Nesehnutí (2004b): Koho vyzbrojuje ?eské ministerstvo obrany?, Press release, available at <http://zbrane.ecn.cz/cz/
tiskovky.html>.
Nesehnutí (2004c): Zpravodaj Alarm, no. 23, May 2004, Reporter, available at <http://www.nesehnuti.cz/cz/alarm/
alarm23.html>.
Nesehnutí (2004d): ?eská republika p?iznala vývozy zbraní do zemí porušujících lidská práva, Press release, available at
<http://zbrane.ecn.cz/cz/tiskovky.html>.
Nesehnutí (2005): NESEHNUTÍ prodávalo zbran?, Press release, available at <http://www.nesehnuti.cz/cz/
tiskovky2005.html>.
Nesehnutí (2006): ?eská republika stále vyváží zbran? do zemí porušující lidská práva, Press release, available at
<http://zbrane.ecn.cz/cz/tiskovky.html>.
St?edoevropské politické studie Ro?ník IX, ?íslo 4, s. 315-332
Central European Political Studies Review Volume IX, Part 4, pp. 315-332
Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity ISSN 1212-7817
332
Nesehnutí (2007): Lidská práva jsou na obtíž – IDET 2007, Press release, available at <http://www.nesehnuti.cz/cz/
tiskovky2007.html>.
Web pages
Arms, or Human Rights? [Zbran?, nebo lidská práva?], available at <http://zbrane.ecn.cz/>.
Independent Social and Ecological Movement Nesehnutí, available at <http://www.nesehnuti.cz/>.
Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, available at <http://www.army.cz>.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, available at <http://www.mzv.cz/>.
Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, available at <http://www.mpo.cz/>.
